Exchange-Rate Regimes and Exporter-Importers

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MOST UP-TO-DATE VERSION

Abstract

I characterize exchange-rate regime breaks for thirty countries between 1960 and 2019, and I document that while they affect the volatilities of nominal and real exchange rates they do not change the volatilities of other real macro fundamentals (output, consumption, investment, and net exports). This is true even in countries in which exports and imports represent a large component of gross domestic product. I propose a model with exporter-importers and segmented global currency markets. The model matches the behavior of nominal and real exchange rates and real macro fundamentals across exchange-rate regimes, even for economies in which the sum of exports and imports is more than 100% of gross domestic product.

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1 Introduction

A large body of the literature in international macroeconomics and finance attempts to evaluate the effects of different exchange-rate regimes on real macro fundamentals. The key natural experiment in this literature is the monetary-policy break in the US regime when the Bretton Woods system collapsed in 1973. My paper offers a more exhaustive understanding of exchange-rate regimes by looking at natural experiments other than the breakdown of the Bretton Woods system. To explain the disconnect between the real exchange rate and other real macro variables in a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model, it also proposes as a theoretical mechanism—grounded in empirical evidence in international trade—that large exporters are also intensive importers.

My first step is to propose a characterization of exchange-rate regimes based on the exchange rates of thirty countries from 1957 to 2019. For all these economies, I show that structural breaks in the volatility of trade-weighted nominal exchange rates are systematically associated with structural breaks in the volatility of trade-weighted real exchange rates. This allows me to consider a larger set of exchange-rate regime breaks than the breakdown of the Bretton Woods system. Second, I document a muted reaction to exchange-rate regime breaks of various real macro variables (output, consumption, investment, and net exports), but not the real exchange rate. The reaction is muted even though I consider countries that have more exports and imports, compared to total output, than the United States. In the United States, the amount of international trade—that is, exports plus imports—is relatively small compared to total output, with an average trade-to-GDP ratio of about 16% between 1960 and 2019; in contrast, Belgium, one of the countries I consider, has an average trade-to-GDP ratio of about 101% over the same period.

Finally, I propose a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model to demonstrate the muted reaction of various real macro variables to nominal- and real-exchange rate movements across exchange-rate regime breaks, assuming financial-market segmentation, deviations from the law of one price, and the presence of exporter-importers. This last feature is crucial to match the observed muted reaction. Indeed, I show that the previous literature cannot match the muted reaction quantitatively. This is true in the aggregate for countries such as Belgium, in which exports and imports account for a large part of overall economic activity. But it is also true for countries such as the United States once I restrict the focus to exports and imports. I show that for the latter countries, the overall muted response results from a mix of a counterfactually large response of exporters and importers, with these firms being a small fraction of the overall economy.

In the first part of the paper, using exchange rates covering thirty countries from 1957 to 2019, I characterize exchange-rate regimes based on a heteroskedasticity approach only. In standard bilateral classifications, the definition of exchange-rate regime for a given country relies on its central bank’s decision to keep the currency either

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1 Examples include Friedman (1953), Mussa (1986), Baxter and Stockman (1989), Monacelli (2004), Ayres, Hevia, and Nicolini (2021), and Itskhoki and Mukhin (2022).
floating or pegged to a reference currency. Bilateral classifications typically identify exchange-rate regime breaks when one of the two central banks changes its decision and induces a simultaneous volatility break in the bilateral series of nominal and real exchange rates. Instead, I identify the structural breaks in the volatility of the trade-weighted nominal and real exchange rates with the structural break test developed by Lavielle (1999) and Lavielle and Moulines (2000). I find that every break in the set of structural breaks in the volatility of the trade-weighted nominal–exchange rate series corresponds to a structural break in the volatility of the trade-weighted real–exchange rate series.

Second, I consider how other real macro time series (output, consumption, investment, exports and imports) react to exchange-rate regime breaks when considering all thirty countries in my sample, which covers sixty-six exchange-rate regime breaks between 1957 and 2019. A robust finding is that the volatilities of all real macro variables show no statistically significant change across breaks, with a single exception: the real exchange rate. This result does not depend on countries’ amount of exports and imports.

The challenge is to explain why, when a country moves from a pegged to a floating regime, the resulting enormous volatility of the real exchange rate is not transmitted to other real macro variables. Therefore, we have to question if we are able to find a set of assumptions that ensure the consistency of a theoretical model with the empirical evidence for an economy such as Belgium with an average trade-to-GDP ratio of about 101% over the 1960–2019 period. I find that there are three assumptions, and they are as follows:

1. Financial markets are imperfect, following Gabaix and Maggiori (2015). In any complete-market model, the condition of efficient international risk sharing tends to make the consumption difference comove with the real exchange rate. But this result is empirically invalidated by several studies (for instance, Backus and Smith 1993). Moreover, this assumption guarantees that the financial element of the model matches a set of empirical facts from the finance literature, the most relevant of which is room for deviations from uncovered interest parity (see Fama 1984).

2. There are deviations from the law of one price in the form of variable markups and local currency pricing, following the empirical industrial-organization literature. For instance, Goldberg and Verboven (2001, 2005) find not only that the law of one price does not hold and that firms fix prices in the currency of the market in which they sell their products, but also that they absorb the exchange-rate shocks thanks to a local component of their marginal costs and markup adjustment. Though this assumption helps to improve the fit of theoretical models to the muted reaction of real macro variables to nominal– and real–exchange rate movements (see, for example, Gabaix and Maggiori 2015 or Itskhoki and Mukhin 2021, 2022), it is not sufficient. In the calibration section, using data on Belgium between 1960 and 2019, I show that a theoretical model that only assumes

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2Traditionally, the United States has been the reference country for non-European countries, whereas Germany has been the reference country for European countries; see Ilzetzki, Reinhart, and Rogoff (2019) and Petracchi (2022).
imperfect financial markets and deviations from the law of one price is unable to match the observed muted reaction. Additionally, I show that such a theoretical model also misses an important feature of the US data: it is unable to capture the muted reaction of either exports or imports to exchange rate movements when they are treated separately (the focus of the previous literature has been only on net exports). Under a floating regime, exchange rates are highly volatile, at a quarterly business cycle frequency, and exporters are not able to prevent exports from responding to exchange rates, although they can adjust their markups and price in terms of the local currency.

3. Large exporters are simultaneously large importers, following Amiti, Itskhoki, and Konings (2014), who use Belgian firm-product-level data on imports and exports between 2000 and 2008. This feature is the key ingredient to match the observed muted reaction of real macro variables to nominal– and real–exchange rate movements in an economy with a large amount of exports and imports, compared to total output, in a general equilibrium model. It is not only theoretically appealing but empirically plausible, considering two stylized facts about Belgium in Amiti, Itskhoki, and Konings (2014). First, the authors find evidence that 78% of exporters in Belgium also import goods and, more crucially, that the exporters who intensively import goods account for 83% of all Belgian exports. Second, they show that the ratio between imported inputs and exports is 74% for the import-intensive exporters. In other words, the import-intensive exporters account for a disproportionately large share of exports and keep their prices unchanged despite exchange-rate volatility, thanks to the imported inputs in the marginal-cost channel. In the calibration section, using data on Belgium between 1960 and 2019, I show that my model with exporter-importers can reproduce the comovement of nominal and real exchange rates and the muted reaction of real macro variables without compromising the fit to other business cycle moments. Additionally, I show that my model it is able to capture the muted reaction of either exports or imports to exchange rate movements, when they are treated separately, for the United States.

Figure 1, depicting time series for Belgium between 1960 and 2019, motivates my work. Panel (a) plots the bilateral nominal exchange rate between Belgium and Germany, the reference country for the Belgian economy, (dashed and in magenta) and the trade-weighted nominal exchange rate between Belgium and the rest of the world (in blue). Both series are in levels, at a quarterly frequency. Panel (b) plots the trade-weighted nominal exchange rate between Belgium and the rest of the world in logarithmic difference and percentage points, at a quarterly frequency.3

Belgium’s regime is typically considered pegged for the entire period.4 Indeed, it was pegged if one simply considers the bilateral nominal exchange rate between Belgium and Germany as shown in Panel (a). But if one considers the trade-weighted nominal exchange rate between Belgium and the rest of the world, the broader picture completely changes.

3See Section 2 for more details about the construction of the series and about the characterization of exchange-rate regimes.

Notes for Panels (a) and (b): The bilateral nominal–exchange rate series between Belgium and Germany is dashed and in magenta, and the trade-weighted nominal–exchange rate series between Belgium and the rest of the world is in blue; I normalize the two series such that they are both equal to 1 in the first quarter of 1960. The vertical lines represent exchange-rate regime breaks identified in the trade-weighted nominal–exchange rate series in logarithmic difference. For details, see Section 2. I shade the periods with floating regimes in the trade-weighted nominal–exchange rate series.

Notes for Panels (c) and (d): The trade-weighted real–exchange rate series is in red and the real consumption-difference series is in green. The vertical lines represent exchange-rate regime breaks identified in the trade-weighted real–exchange rate series in logarithmic difference. For details, see Section 2. I shade the periods with floating regimes in the trade-weighted real–exchange rate series.

Sources: The Bank of Italy’s Exchange Rates Portal, the International Monetary Fund’s Direction of Trade Statistics and International Financial Statistics, and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development’s OECD.Stat. For details, see Section 2.


Crucially, the four exchange-rate regime breaks are present not because of Belgian-German bilateral exchange-rate regime breaks but because of Belgium’s trading partners, which experienced exchange-rate regime breaks in relation to Germany; as a consequence, they can be interpreted as macro-level shocks exogenous to Belgian monetary policy and economic conditions, offering a setting to identify the effects of different exchange-rate regimes.

Panels (c) and (d) in Figure 1 plot Belgium’s trade-weighted real–exchange rate series (in red) and its real-consumption-difference series (in green), at a quarterly frequency, between 1960 and 2019. Both series are in log-
nThe trade-weighted real–exchange rate series presents four structural breaks in volatility, corresponding to the four exchange-rate regime breaks in the Belgian trade-weighted nominal exchange rate. Meanwhile, the real-consumption-difference series presents no structural breaks; the macro-level shocks do not alter the volatility of the real-consumption-difference series, even in an economy with a large amount of exports and imports compared to total output.\(^5\)

I show that theoretical models without exporter-importers have a hard time matching the muted reaction of real macro variables to nominal– and real–exchange rate movements for a country such as Belgium. Indeed, the muted reaction of real macro variables in the theoretical model of Itskhoki and Mukhin (2021, 2022), a model without exporter-importers, arises thanks to a calibration that targets the US economy, a country in which exports and imports are relatively small compared to total output.\(^6\) A natural way to overcome this issue is to take advantage of Amiti, Itskhoki, and Konings’s (2014) micro evidence on large exporters that are simultaneously large importers.


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\(^5\)Another way to interpret Panels (c) and (d) in Figure 1 is that complete-market models with a constant-relative-risk-aversion utility function and nominal price rigidity (for example, Monacelli 2004) cannot match the muted reaction of the real-consumption-difference series to exchange-rate regime breaks since they do not violate the Backus and Smith (1993) condition of efficient international risk sharing.

\(^6\)Itskhoki and Mukhin (2021, 2022) discuss other examples of economies with larger amounts of exports and imports compared to total output, than the United States, but they do not consider economies, in which the sum of exports and imports is more than 100% of gross domestic product. Similarly to footnote 5, another way to interpret this result is that imperfect-financial-market models without exporter-importers are not able to match the muted reaction of the real-consumption-difference series to exchange-rate regime breaks since the volatility of the real exchange rate is transmitted to the rest of the economy when real factor markets clear.

\(^7\)Using bilateral time series primarily on the United States and thirteen advanced countries between 1957 and 1984, Mussa (1986) documents what is now referred to as the Mussa Puzzle: the 1973 breakdown of the Bretton Woods system increased the volatility of not only the nominal US-dollar exchange rate but the real US-dollar exchange rate, which implies monetary non-neutrality.

\(^8\)See also Benigno, Benigno, and Ghironi (2007), Benigno and Benigno (2008), Collard and Della (2006), Fornaro (2015), Ayres, Hevia, and Nicolini (2021), and Flaccadoro and Nispi Landi (2022).

\(^9\)See also Barbiero (2022) and Blaum (2022).
2 Empirical Facts and Exchange-Rate Regimes

In Section 2.1, I introduce a characterization of exchange-rate regimes, based on thirty countries from 1957 to 2019, and provide evidence for the Mussa puzzle—the fact that nominal and real exchange rates comove across exchange-rate regimes—in the context of trade-weighted exchange rates. In Section 2.2, I consider real-macro-variable time series—output, consumption, investment, and net exports—of the thirty countries to show that exchange rate disconnect—that is, the muted reaction of real macro variables to real exchange-rate movements—remains persistent across exchange-rate regimes.\(^\text{10}\)

Data. I use quarterly data covering thirty countries—twenty-four European countries and six non-European G20 countries—from 1957 to 2019:\(^\text{11}\) twenty-one European Union member countries, Norway, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, Australia, Brazil, Canada, Japan, South Africa, and the United States.\(^\text{12}\)

2.1 A Characterization of Exchange-Rate Regimes

I begin by constructing trade-weighted exchange rates with a twofold purpose. First, they allow me to empirically evaluate the magnitude of exchange-rate shocks, for any given country in relation to its trading partners, which have to be considered in general equilibrium models. Second, they allow me to introduce a characterization of exchange-rate regimes, where I identify exchange-rate regime breaks through a heteroskedasticity-based approach. This characterization forms the backbone of my critical assessment of exchange rate disconnect across exchange-rate regimes in Section 2.2.

Monthly time-series data on bilateral nominal exchange rates come from the Exchange Rates Portal of the Bank of Italy; I use the Deutsche Mark as the reference currency for the studied European countries and the US dollar for the non-European G20 countries. I obtain the bilateral nominal-exchange-rate time series for each European country by combining the dollar/Deutsche Mark time series and the dollar/euro time series after December 2001, at which time 1 euro was worth 1.95583 Deutsche Marks, with the various other dollar/foreign-currency time series.\(^\text{13}\) I then convert monthly nominal exchange rates to quarterly ones and combine them, using the trade weights from the International Monetary Fund’s Direction of Trade Statistics, to obtain trade-weighted nominal exchange rates.\(^\text{14}\)

Finally, I combine the latter rates with quarterly CPIs from the International Monetary Fund’s International Financial

\(^{10}\)The phrase “exchange rate disconnect” generically refers to the absence of correlation between exchange rates and other macro variables; see Obstfeld and Rogoff (2000).

\(^{11}\)Complete data for all the considered countries are not available. A list of time periods for each country’s variable can be found in Table 7 in Appendix A.2.

\(^{12}\)The twenty-four studied member countries of the European Union are Austria, Belgium, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany (West Germany before October 1990), Greece, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, the Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, and Sweden.

\(^{13}\)If a currency was renominated—for example, the French franc in January 1960—I normalized the series in order to remove the ensuing jump.

\(^{14}\)For any given country, I use as weights the mean values of its exports and imports, averaged over the 1957-2019 period, to and from Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
Statistics, using the same weights as above, to obtain CPI-based trade-weighted real exchange rates.\(^{15}\)

Next, I identify the exchange-rate regime breaks by applying the heteroskedasticity-break test, developed by Lavielle (1999) and Lavielle and Moulines (2000), to the first difference of the natural logarithm of the nominal exchange rate, \(\Delta e_t\), and the first difference of the natural logarithm of the real exchange rate, \(\Delta q_t\), which are formally defined as follows:

\[
\Delta q_t = \Delta e_t + \pi^*_t - \pi_t.
\]

Here, \(q_t = \ln(Q_t)\), \(e_t = \ln(E_t)\), and \(\pi^*_t - \pi_t\) is the difference between the inflation rate in the foreign country, \(\pi^*_t = \ln(P^*_t) - \ln(P^*_{t-1})\), and the inflation rate in the rest of the world (home country), \(\pi_t = \ln(P_t) - \ln(P_{t-1})\).\(^{16}\)

The test yields the results for Belgium that are reported in the third column of Table 1. Table 1, together with Table 8 in Appendix A.2.1, which reports the results for all the other studied countries, represents the first main empirical result of this paper. The heteroskedasticity-break test identifies structural breaks in the nominal– and real–exchange-rate series that characterize two types of exchange-rate regime: periods of low exchange-rate volatility (pegged regimes) and periods of high exchange-rate volatility (floating regimes).\(^{17}\)

This characterization of exchange-rate regimes confirms the Mussa puzzle for the reference-currency countries (Germany and the United States) and countries that formally switched their exchange-rate regime from pegged to floating or vice versa (for example, Brazil and the Czech Republic). It also shows the puzzle for economies that never formally switched in the studied period—for example, Austria and Belgium. For two reasons, this turns out to be crucial for understanding how exchange-rate regimes affect the real economy. First, in the economies that did not switch, the exchange-rate regime breaks are exogenous to their monetary-policy decisions and domestic economic conditions, offering a setting to identify the effects of different exchange-rate regimes.\(^{18}\) Second, Tables 1 and 8 identify exchange-rate regime breaks, and hence changes from periods of low volatility of the nominal– and real–exchange-rate series to periods of high volatility (and vice versa), for countries for which exports and imports are relatively large compared to total output, offering an ideal setting to test exchange rate disconnect.

\(^{15}\)For brevity, from here on, I use the phrase “the rest of the world” (home country) to indicate Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States; the term “nominal exchange rate” to refer to the trade-weighted nominal exchange rate; and the term “real exchange rate” to refer to the CPI-based trade-weighted real exchange rate.

\(^{16}\)A complete description of the Lavielle (1999) and Lavielle and Moulines (2000) test can be found in Appendix A.2.1.

\(^{17}\)The figures for the \(\Delta e_t\) and \(\Delta q_t\) series with the identified regimes, for all the considered countries, are in Appendix A.2.1. The heteroskedasticity-break test does not always identify the structural breaks in the volatility of the nominal– and real–exchange-rate series in the same quarters since it is very sensitive to observations that significantly depart from the rest.

\(^{18}\)This a much stronger identification strategy than in a standard regression-discontinuity design, in which identification does not rely on the exogeneity of the exchange-rate regime break but only requires that potential confounders evolve continuously around the exchange-rate regime breaks.
Table 1: Belgium’s Exchange-Rate Regimes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nominal Exchange Rate</th>
<th>Real Exchange Rate</th>
<th>Exchange-Rate Regime</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>April 1998 - December 2019</td>
<td>April 1997 - December 2019</td>
<td>Pegged Regime</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2.2 Exchange Rate Disconnect across Exchange-Rate Regimes

Quarterly time-series data on real macro variables—output, consumption, investment, exports, and imports—come from the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development’s OECD.Stat and allow me to evaluate the effect of different exchange-rate regimes. A strand of literature, dating back to Friedman (1953), evaluates the effects of different exchange-rate regimes and asks one of the enduring questions in international macroeconomics and finance: what are the effects of different exchange-rate regimes? Surprisingly, though, it examines principally the breakdown of the Bretton Woods system in 1973 and neglects other, similar natural experiments. This neglect has induced researchers to focus on the United States since the breakdown of the Bretton Woods system represented a break in the US exchange-rate regime. Thus, most answers rely on an exogenous shock that happened almost fifty years ago and, more importantly, hit a country for which exports and imports are small compared to total output.19 This section offers a more comprehensive answer by considering thirty countries between 1960 and 2019 and including several exchange-rate regime breaks (in addition to the breakdown of the Bretton Woods system), as presented in Tables 1 and 8.

Panel (a) of Figure 2 plots annualized standard deviations of real exchange rates in logarithmic difference and percentage points \( \sigma(\Delta y_t) \) against annualized standard deviations of real output in logarithmic difference and percentage points \( \sigma(\Delta q_t) \). These annualized standard deviations are computed across the exchange-rate regimes presented in Tables 1 and 8; the standard deviations are in red (circles) for the pegged regimes and in blue (triangles) for the floating regimes. It is easy to see that when moving from pegged to floating regimes, the volatility of real exchange rates systematically increases for all the studied countries.

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19See Panels (c) and (d) of Figure 2 for evidence on other countries.
But it is not obvious what happens to output volatility when moving from pegged to floating regimes: for some countries, output volatility increases (for instance, Greece [GRC]); for others, it decreases (for instance, Brazil [BRA]).

To offer a more systematic answer to what happens to output volatility, Panel (b) of Figure 2 reports in green, country by country, the differences in $\sigma(\Delta y_t)$ across exchange-rate regimes ($\Delta [\sigma(\Delta y_t)]$) against the differences in $\sigma(\Delta q_t)$ across exchange-rate regimes ($\Delta [\sigma(\Delta q_t)]$). Overall, Panel (b) of Figure 2 shows a negative correlation that is not statistically significant.\textsuperscript{20}

Panels (c) and (d) of Figure 2 expand on this result by plotting $\sigma(\Delta q_t)$ and $\sigma(\Delta y_t)$ against countries’ import-to-GDP ratio across exchange-rate regimes.\textsuperscript{21} Under the pegged regimes, the standard deviations of $\Delta q_t$ and $\Delta y_t$ are in red (circles); under the floating regimes, in blue (triangles). Panels (c) and (d) document that when one orders the

\textsuperscript{20}The coefficient of the OLS regression of $\Delta [\sigma(\Delta y_t)]$ on $\Delta [\sigma(\Delta q_t)]$ is -0.062 and the relative 95% confidence interval [-0.311, 0.188], using heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors, indeed includes zero (the p-value of the test, under the null hypothesis of an OLS coefficient equal to zero, is 0.616).

\textsuperscript{21}For each country, I use as a proxy for the amount of international trade its mean import-to-GDP ratio, for the corresponding time period in Table 7 in Appendix A.2, which is the relevant value to calibrate the openness-to-international-trade parameter $\gamma$ in the theoretical model.
countries by import-to-GDP ratio, moving from a pegged to a floating regime increases mean real–exchange-rate volatility (upper part) without changing mean output volatility (lower part). The characterization of exchange-rate regimes documents that exchange-rate regime breaks are associated with large changes in the volatility of trade-weighted real exchange rates. This result can also be seen in Panel (c) of Figure 2, where we see that moving from pegged to floating regimes increases the mean standard deviation of the real exchange rate by about 350%, from 2.389 to 8.351. However, this result makes the finding of Panel (d) of Figure 2 much more puzzling with respect to the Mussa puzzle and the US economy, which is represented by the leftmost two points: not only does moving from pegged to floating not change the mean standard deviation of real output across regimes, but it does not systematically increase output volatility in economies for which imports are relatively small compared to total output (those in the center and on the left). Moreover, Table 2 reports the OLS coefficients of the regression of $\sigma(\Delta q_t)$ on import-to-GDP ratio and the regression of $\sigma(\Delta y_t)$ on import-to-GDP ratio across exchange-rate regimes. It formally shows that there is no statistically significant correlation between the volatilities of real exchange rates (nor real output) and countries’ import-to-GDP ratio across exchange-rate regimes.

Countries experience exchange-rate regime breaks, increasing the volatility of their real exchange rates and hence real shocks to their economies, but do not display systematically increased volatility in their real output; additionally, I find no statistically significant correlation between the volatilities of real exchange rates (nor output) and countries’ amount of trade with the rest of the world in either regime (Table 2).

Finally, Table 3 provides some additional details by including other real macro variables: consumption ($\Delta c_t$), investment ($\Delta z_t$), and net exports ($\Delta n.x_t$). Under the pegged regimes, the mean volatility of the real exchange rate is low and at the same order of magnitude as real output’s mean volatility, but there is a disconnect under the floating regimes: the floating-pegged ratio for the real exchange rate is about 3.5, but the ratio is around 1 for all the other real variables. Thus, the second main empirical result of the paper is that exchange rate disconnect remains persistent across exchange-rate regimes, even when countries for which imports, compared to total output, are larger than the United States are studied. The above patterns of change in the volatility of the real exchange rate and other macro variables motivate my theoretical analysis in the next section, which aims to resolve exchange rate disconnect without relying on a country’s openness-to-international-trade parameter $\gamma$. 

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### Table 2: Relationship between Import-to-GDP Ratio and Volatilities across Exchange-Rate Regimes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Exchange-Rate Regime</th>
<th>$\sigma(\Delta q_t)$</th>
<th>$\sigma(\Delta y_t)$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pegged Regime</td>
<td>-1.260</td>
<td>0.721</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[-2.767, 0.246]</td>
<td>[-0.776, 2.219]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Floating Regime</td>
<td>-2.000</td>
<td>1.324</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[-6.082, 2.083]</td>
<td>[-0.282, 2.930]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: The second column reports the OLS coefficients of the regression of annualized standard deviations of $\Delta q_t$ on import-to-GDP ratio across exchange-rate regimes; the third column reports the OLS coefficients of the regression of annualized standard deviations of $\Delta y_t$ on import-to-GDP ratio across exchange-rate regimes; 95% confidence intervals, using heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors, are in square brackets, and the p-values of the test, under the null hypothesis of an OLS coefficient equal to zero, are 0.098 [pegged regime / $\sigma(\Delta q_t)$], 0.332 [pegged regime / $\sigma(\Delta y_t)$], 0.324 [floating regime / $\sigma(\Delta q_t)$], 0.102 [floating regime / $\sigma(\Delta y_t)$].

### Table 3: Volatilities across Exchange-Rate Regimes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Exchange-Rate Regime</th>
<th>$\sigma(\Delta q_t)$</th>
<th>$\sigma(\Delta y_t)$</th>
<th>$\sigma(\Delta c_t)$</th>
<th>$\sigma(\Delta z_t)$</th>
<th>$\sigma(\Delta nx_t)$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pegged Regime</td>
<td>2.389</td>
<td>2.517</td>
<td>2.320</td>
<td>8.904</td>
<td>3.844</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[2.051, 2.726]</td>
<td>[2.146, 2.889]</td>
<td>[1.875, 2.766]</td>
<td>[5.308, 12.500]</td>
<td>[2.975, 4.713]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Floating Regime</td>
<td>8.351</td>
<td>2.532</td>
<td>2.806</td>
<td>7.996</td>
<td>4.231</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[7.301, 9.401]</td>
<td>[2.099, 2.965]</td>
<td>[2.257, 3.356]</td>
<td>[6.533, 9.458]</td>
<td>[3.592, 4.872]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Floating-Pegged Ratio</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: The table reports the mean annualized standard deviations of real macro variables across exchange-rate regimes; 95% confidence intervals, using heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors, are in square brackets, and the p-values of the test, under the null hypothesis of equal means across exchange-rate regimes, are respectively 0.000, 0.958, 0.165, 0.635, and 0.466.

### 3 Theoretical Framework

My model builds on an international real business cycle model with productivity and financial shocks, and it includes three crucial features: imperfect financial markets, deviations (in the form of variable markups and local currency pricing) from the law of one price, and exporter-importers. Section 3.1 explains the model. Sections 3.2 explains how resolving exchange rate disconnect requires that exporters simultaneously be intensive importers. In
Section 3.3, I complement the model-based analysis with the quantitative results from the calibration. I show that a theoretical model without exporter-importers, the model of Itskhoki and Mukhin (2021, 2022), cannot match the observed exchange rate disconnect and that my model can reproduce the Mussa puzzle and exchange rate disconnect without compromising its ability to fit other business cycle moments.

3.1 Model

Time is discrete and runs forever: \( t = 0, 1, 2, \ldots \). There are two countries—home (France) and foreign (Belgium, denoted with an asterisk)—each with its own nominal unit of account in which local prices are quoted. The nominal exchange rate \( E_t \) is the price of Belgian francs in French francs: an increase in \( E_t \) corresponds to a nominal devaluation of the home currency (the French franc). The real exchange rate, \( Q_t \equiv (P_t^* E_t) / P_t \), is the relative consumer price level in the two countries, with \( P_t^* \) being the CPI in the foreign country and \( P_t \) being the CPI in the home country. An increase in \( Q_t \) corresponds to a real depreciation of the home currency—that is, a decrease in the relative price of the home consumption basket. Each country’s economy is populated by households, two types of firms (domestic firms and exporters), and a government.

The countries are symmetric with the exception of their exchange-rate regime: the foreign country always conducts its monetary policy according to a Taylor rule by targeting inflation (a floating regime), while the home country conducts its monetary policy according to a Taylor rule that switches from targeting the nominal exchange rate (a pegged regime) to targeting inflation (a floating regime). In the following description, I focus on the home country.

3.1.1 The Home Country

**Households.** The representative household solves the following consumption-savings problem, maximizing its discounted expected utility over final consumption \( C_t \) and labor \( L_t \):

\[
\max_{(C_t, L_t)} \mathbb{E}_0 \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t \left( \frac{1}{1-\sigma} C_t^{1-\sigma} - \frac{1}{1+\phi} L_t^{1+\phi} \right).
\]

Here, \( \beta \) is the household discount factor, \( \sigma \) is the relative-risk-aversion parameter, and \( \phi \) is the inverse Frisch elasticity of labor supply, subject to the following budget constraint:

\[
P_t C_t + P_t Z_t + \frac{B_t+1}{R_t} \leq W_t L_t + R_t^k K_t + B_t + \Pi_t + \Pi_t^e.
\]

Here, \( P_t \) is the CPI, \( B_t \) is the quantity of the home-currency risk-free bond paying out one unit of the home currency next period, \( R_t \) is the gross nominal interest rate, \( W_t \) is the nominal wage rate, \( R_t^k \) is the nominal rental rate of capital, \( K_t \) is the capital stock, \( \Pi_t \) are the dividends from the domestic firms, and \( \Pi_t^e \) are the dividends from the
The representative household allocates its within-period consumption expenditure $P_t C_t$ between the home good $C_{Ht}$ and the foreign good $C_{Ft}$, to minimize expenditure on final consumption $C_t$:

$$P_t C_t = \int_0^1 [P_{Ht}(i)C_{Ht}(i) + P_{Ft}(i)C_{Ft}(i)] \, di.$$  

Here, $P_{Ht}$ and $P_{Ft}$ are the home-currency prices of the home and foreign goods. Final consumption $C_t$ is implicitly defined by the Kimball (1995) aggregator as follows:

$$\int_0^1 \left[ (1 - \gamma)g\left( \frac{C_{Ht}(i)}{(1 - \gamma)C_t} \right) + \gamma g\left( \frac{C_{Ft}(i)}{\gamma C_t} \right) \right] \, di = 1.$$  

Here, $\gamma$ is the openness-to-international-trade parameter and the function $g(\cdot)$ is increasing and concave with $-g''(1) \in (0, 1)$ and $g(1) = g'(1) = 1$. This minimization results in the following demand schedules:

$$C_{Ht}(i) = (1 - \gamma)h\left( \frac{P_{Ht}(i)}{P_t} \right) C_t \quad \text{and} \quad C_{Ft}(j) = (1 - \gamma)h\left( \frac{P_{Ft}(j)}{P_t} \right) C_t.$$  

Here, the function $h(\cdot) = g'^{-1}(\cdot)$ and controls the curvatures of the demand schedules.\footnote{In this setting, the point elasticity $\theta = -h'(1)$, whereas the CPI $P_t$ and the auxiliary variable $P_t$ are implicitly defined by the consumption-expenditure equation and by the Kimball (1995) aggregator, after substituting the home demand schedules. The constant-elasticity-of-substitution aggregator, with elasticity of substitution $\theta$, is a special case of the Kimball (1995) aggregator when $g(x) = 1 + \frac{\theta}{\theta - 1} \left( x^{1-\frac{1}{\theta}} \right)$.}

$Z_t$, gross investment in the capital stock $K_t$, accumulates according to the following rule—quadratic capital adjustment costs—with depreciation $\delta$ and capital adjustment cost $\kappa$:

$$K_{t+1} = (1 - \delta)K_t + \left[ Z_t - \frac{\kappa}{2} \frac{(\Delta K_{t+1})^2}{K_t} \right].$$  

Gross investment $Z_t$ is a bundle of domestic and foreign varieties, as final consumption $C_t$, aggregated according to an analogous Kimball (1995) aggregator and demanded according to analogous demand schedules.

Finally, I assume that the representative household in the home country trades only home-currency bonds and owns only home domestic firms and exporters.

**Domestic firms.** The representative domestic firm $i$ produces using a Cobb-Douglas technology with labor $L_t$, capital $K_t$, and intermediate inputs $X_t$:

$$Y_{Ht} = \left( e^{\eta_i} K_i^{\theta} L_t^{1-\theta} \right)^{1-\phi} X_t^{\phi}.$$  

Here, $a_t$ is the natural logarithm of total factor productivity, which follows an AR(1) process:

$$a_t = \rho_a a_{t-1} + \sigma_a \epsilon_t, \quad \epsilon_t \sim \mathcal{N}(0, 1).$$

Here, the persistent parameter $\rho_a \in [0, 1]$ and the volatility of the innovation $\sigma_a \geq 0$. The intermediate input $X_t$ is a bundle of domestic and foreign varieties, like final consumption $C_t$ and gross investment $Z_t$, aggregated according to an analogous Kimball (1995) aggregator and demanded according to analogous demand schedules.

Given the nominal rental rate of capital $R^k_t$, the nominal wage rate $W_t$, and the CPI $P_t$, the associated marginal cost of production for the domestic firm is

$$MC_t = \frac{1}{\varpi} \left[ e^{-a_t R^k_t W_t^{1-\theta}} \right]^{1-\phi} P_t^\phi, \quad \text{where} \quad \varpi = \phi^\phi \left[ (1 - \phi) \theta^\theta (1 - \theta)^{1-\theta} \right]^{1-\phi}.$$

In serving the home market, the domestic firm maximizes profits,

$$\Pi_t(i) = (P_{Ht}(i) - MC_t) Y_{Ht}(i),$$

by optimally setting $P_{Ht}(i)$. Thanks to the Kimball (1995) aggregator, such profit maximization results in variable-markup pricing with a common price across all domestic firms $i$:

$$P_{Ht}(i) = P_{Ht} = \mu \left( \frac{P_{Ht}}{P_t} \right) MC_t.$$

Here, the markup function $\mu(x) = \frac{\partial \ln h(x)}{\partial \ln h(x) - 1}$ is derived from the demand schedules of $C_t$, $K_t$, and $X_t$ in the home country. The aggregate profits of the domestic firms, $\Pi_t = \int_1^1 \Pi_t(i) di$, are distributed to the households.

**Exporter-importers.** The main innovation of my theoretical model is the representative exporter-importer $j$, which still produces using a Cobb-Douglas technology with labor $L_t$, capital $K_t$, and intermediate inputs $X_t$ but also directly imports intermediate inputs $E^*_F t$ from the foreign country. That technology is the following:

$$Y^*_{Ht} = \left[ \left( e^{a_t K_t^{\theta} L_t^{(1-\theta)}} \right)^{1-\phi} X_t^\phi \right]^{1-\phi^*} (E^*_F t)^{\phi^*}. \quad (1)$$

Here, $E^*_F t$ is a foreign good priced in the foreign currency.

Given the foreign-currency price of the foreign good $P^*_F t$, the associated marginal cost of production for the exporter-importer is

$$MC^*_t = \frac{1}{\varpi^*} \left\{ \left[ e^{-a_t R^k_t W_t^{1-\theta}} \right]^{1-\phi} P_t^\phi \right\}^{1-\phi^*} (E^*_F P^*_F t)^{\phi^*}, \quad \text{where}$$
\[ \varpi^e \equiv \phi^e \phi^e \left\{ (1 - \phi^e) \phi^e \left[ (1 - \phi^e) \phi^e (1 - \phi^e) \right]^{1 - \phi^e} \right\}^{1 - \phi^e}. \]

In serving the foreign market, the exporter-importer maximizes profits,

\[ \Pi^e_t(j) = (P^*_H_t(j) \xi_t - ME_t^e) Y^*_H_t(j), \]

by optimally setting \( P^*_H_t(j) \). Thanks to the Kimball (1995) aggregator, such profit maximization results in variable-markup pricing with a common price across all exporter-importers \( j \):

\[ P^*_H_t(j) = P^*_H_t = \mu \left( \frac{P^*_H_t}{P^*_t} \right) \frac{MC^e_t}{\xi_t}. \]

Here, the markup function \( \mu(x) \) is derived from the demand schedules of \( C^*_t, K^*_t, \) and \( X^*_t \) in the foreign country. The aggregate profits of the exporter-importers, \( \Pi^e_t = \int_0^1 \Pi^e_t(j) \, dj \), are distributed to the households.

**Government in the home country.** The fiscal authority is fully passive in the sense that I abstract from government spending and taxation, whereas the monetary authority conducts monetary policy according to the following Taylor rule:

\[ i_t = \rho_i i_{t-1} + (1 - \rho_i) [\omega^\pi \pi_t + \omega^e (e_t - \bar{e})]. \]

Here, \( i_t = \ln (R_t) \), \( \bar{e} \) is the natural logarithm of the targeted nominal exchange rate, \( 0 \geq \rho_i \leq 1, \omega^\pi > 1, \) and \( \omega^e \geq 0 \). The parameter \( \rho_i \) represents interest rate smoothing in the monetary-policy rule, whereas the parameters \( \omega^\pi \) and \( \omega^e \) respectively represent the weights of the two monetary-policy objectives, inflation targeting and nominal-exchange-rate targeting. When \( \omega^e = 0 \), the monetary authority implements a floating regime; when \( \omega^e > 0 \), a pegged regime.

### 3.1.2 The Foreign Country

The foreign country is fully symmetric to the home country except that the monetary authority conducts monetary policy according to the following Taylor rule:

\[ i^*_t = \rho^*_i i^*_{t-1} + (1 - \rho^*_i) \omega^*_\pi \pi^*_t. \]

Here, \( 0 \geq \rho^*_i \leq 1 \) and \( \omega^*_\pi > 1 \). The parameter \( \rho^*_i \) represents interest rate smoothing in the monetary-policy rule. Unlike in the home country, the monetary authority always implements a floating regime.
3.1.3 International Financial Market

The international financial market is segmented as in Gabaix and Maggiori (2015) since the home and foreign households cannot directly trade any bonds with each other. Their international financial positions are intermediated by a unit mass of global financial firms, each managed by a financier. The representative financier solves the following constrained problem:

$$\max_{Q_t} V_t = E_t \left[ \beta (R_t - R^{\epsilon}_{t+1} E_t^{-1}) \right] Q_t, \quad \text{subject to} \quad V_t \geq \Gamma_t \frac{Q_t^2}{E_t}. $$

Here, $Q_t$ is the balance-sheet position of the financier, in French francs, and $\Gamma_t = \xi \left[ \text{var}_t (E_t^{-1}) \right]^\alpha$, with $\xi \geq 0$ and $\alpha \geq 0$. $\Gamma_t$ represents the financiers’ risk-bearing capacity. For simplicity and tractability of the model, I assume that financiers rebate their profits and losses to the foreign households, not the home ones.\(^{23}\)

3.1.4 Market Clearing

**Labor and capital markets.** In the home and foreign countries, nominal wage rates $W_t$ and $W^*_t$ adjust to clear the home and foreign labor markets, respectively, and nominal rental rates of capital $K_t$ and $K^*_t$ adjust to respectively clear the home and foreign capital markets, respectively.

**Goods market.** In the home country, clearing the goods market requires that total production by the home domestic firms and exporters is split between supply to the home and foreign markets respectively and satisfies the demand in each market:

$$Y_t = Y_{Ht} + Y^*_{Ht},$$

$$Y_{Ht} = C_{Ht} + X_{Ht} + Z_{Ht} + E_{Ht} = (1 - \gamma) h \left( \frac{P_{Ht}}{P_t} \right) [C_t + X_t + Z_t] + E_{Ht}, \quad \text{and} \quad Y^*_{Ht} = C^*_{Ht} + X^*_{Ht} + Z^*_{Ht} = \gamma h \left( \frac{P^*_{Ht}}{P^*_t} \right) [C^*_t + X^*_t + Z^*_t].$$

Finally, I derive the home country’s budget constraint:

$$\frac{B_{t+1}}{R_t} - B_t = NX_t \quad \text{with} \quad NX_t = (\mathcal{E}_t P^*_{Ht} Y_{Ht}^* + P_{Ht} E_{Ht}) - (P_{Ft} Y_{Ft} + \mathcal{E}_t P^*_{Ft} E^*_{Ft}).$$

Here, $NX_t$ are net exports in units of the home currency.

Net exports contain two extra terms, relative to a model without exporter-importers: the directly imported inputs of the foreign exporter-importers ($E_{Ht}$) and the directly imported inputs of the home exporter-importers ($E^*_{Ft}$),

\(^{23}\) I introduce exogenous financial shocks to the international financial market only in the linearized version of the model, without taking a stance on their microfoundation, as they can be equally generated in the nonlinear model from exogenous portfolio flows of the households, as in Gabaix and Maggiori (2015); from noise traders, as in Itskhoki and Mukhin (2021, 2022); or from biased exchange-rate expectations, as in Jeanne and Rose (2002).
which are priced in home and foreign currencies, respectively.

**International financial market.** Clearing the international financial market requires that the balance sheet position of the financiers in French francs \( Q_t \) equals \( B_t \) and the balance sheet position of the financiers in Belgian francs \( Q_t^* \) equals \( B_t^* \).

### 3.1.5 Equilibrium Definition and Model Solution

In the Appendix, I define an equilibrium in the nonlinear model. I then solve the model by logarithmic linearization around a symmetric steady state and define an equilibrium in the linearized model. From now on, I denote all the expressions in terms of deviations from the symmetric steady-state equilibrium; for example, \( y_t \equiv \ln(Y_t) - \ln(\bar{Y}) \), using small letters for natural logarithms.

### 3.2 Exporter-Importers Resolving Exchange Rate Disconnect

Two equations characterize the linearized model around a symmetric steady state: the modified UIP condition in the international financial market, and the home flow budget constraint.

Equilibrium in the international financial market results in the following modified UIP condition, which is subject to exogenous financial shocks:

\[
i_t - i_t^* - E_t \Delta e_{t+1} = \chi_1 \psi_t - \chi_2 b_{t+1}.
\] (2)

Here, \( b_{t+1} = B_{t+1}/\bar{Y} \), \( \chi_1 = \Gamma \beta \), and \( \chi_2 = \bar{Y} \Gamma \). The financial shocks \( \psi_t \) follow an AR(1) process:

\[
\psi_t = \rho_\psi \psi_{t-1} + \sigma_\psi \epsilon_t, \quad \epsilon_t \sim \mathcal{N}(0,1).
\]

The persistent parameter \( \rho_\psi \in [0,1] \), and the volatility of the innovation \( \sigma_\psi \geq 0 \).

When the financiers’ risk-bearing capacity \( \Gamma = 0 \), they can absorb any imbalances, which results in no deviation from the UIP condition: \( i_t - i_t^* - E_t \Delta e_{t+1} = 0 \). The higher the \( \Gamma \)—that is, the lower the financiers’ risk-bearing capacity—the more segmented the international financial market. For \( 0 < \Gamma < \infty \), the model endogenously generates UIP deviations.

The home country’s flow budget constraint results in the following equation:

\[
nx_t = (1 - \phi^e) \bar{\gamma} e_t + \bar{\gamma} (y_{Ht}^* - y_{Ft} - p_{Ht}^* - p_{Ft}) + \phi^e \bar{\gamma} (e_{Ht}^* - e_{Ft} + p_{Ht} - p_{Ft}).
\] (3)

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24 The complete derivation of the model solution, together with the approximated equilibrium definition in the linear model, is in the Appendix.

25 Given the symmetry in the model, the foreign country’s flow budget constraint is analogous.

26 See footnote 23.

27 If \( \Gamma \uparrow \infty \), the financiers are unwilling to absorb any imbalances; that is, they do not take any positions in international financial markets.
Here, \( nx_t = \frac{NX_t}{Y_t} \) and \( \tilde{\gamma} \equiv \frac{\gamma}{1 + \phi^c \gamma} \).

Thanks to the inclusion of exporter-importers, I can state the following proposition on how to resolve exchange rate disconnect under the floating regime.\(^{28}\) I relegate the quantitative analysis to Section 3.3.

**PROPOSITION.**

Assume that \( \Gamma > 0 \) and \( \omega_e = 0 \). For any value of \( \gamma \), \( c_t - c^*_t (y_t - y^*_t) \) is independent of \( q_t \) if \( \phi^c \to 1 \).

**Proof.** See Appendix.

**Discussion.** Here, I show how my model’s feature contributes to the literature with the aid of three crucial parameters: \( \Gamma \), the financiers’ risk-bearing capacity; \( \gamma \), the openness-to-international-trade parameter; and \( \phi^c \), the import intensity of the exporters.

Monacelli (2004). If the financiers’ risk-bearing capacity \( \Gamma = 0 \), the financiers are able to absorb any imbalances, resulting in no deviation from the UIP condition. The model collapses to a model without financial-market frictions, similar to Monacelli’s (2004) model, in which the Backus and Smith (1993) condition of efficient international risk sharing holds and the consumption difference across countries comoves with the real exchange rate. This model outcome is empirically implausible under the floating regimes because of the absence of simultaneous structural breaks in the consumption-difference volatility.\(^{29}\)

Itskhoki and Mukhin (2021, 2022). \( \Gamma > 0 \) with \( \gamma \to 0 \) is the solution adopted by Itskhoki and Mukhin (2021, 2022). In this world, \( \phi^c = 0 \), the exporters are not intensive importers, and their production technology is identical to domestic firms.\(^{30}\) Equation (3) becomes equal to the following:

\[
nx_t = \gamma(e_t + y^e_t - y^f_t + p^e_t - p^f_t). \tag{4}
\]

Equation (4) illustrates how the openness-to-international-trade parameter plays a crucial role in isolating the exchange-rate volatility in the home economy under the floating regimes. This is because if \( \gamma \to 0 \), as is true for the US economy, real variables do not react (\( \gamma = 0 \) represents complete autarky). However, as we will see in Section 3.3, this resolution under the floating regime does not work for Belgium, since real macro variables strongly react when the openness-to-international-trade parameter \( \gamma > 0 \). In the case of the United States with \( \gamma \to 0 \), it is, however, unable to capture the muted reaction of exports \( y^e_t \) and imports \( y^f_t \), taken into account separately, to exchange-rate movements.

**Exporter-importers.** Incorporating exporter-importers is my main theoretical finding, as it allows me to account

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\(^{28}\) I state the proposition for the home country; a symmetric one applies for the foreign country.

\(^{29}\) However, if one introduces price stickiness à la Calvo (1983), the model is able to match the fact that nominal and real exchange rates comove across exchange-rate regime breaks.

\(^{30}\) Indeed, when \( \phi^c = 0 \), my production side collapses to that in Itskhoki and Mukhin (2021, 2022).
for economies for which exports and imports are big compared to total output, with exporter-importers à la Amiti, Itskhoki, and Konings (2014): $\Gamma > 0, \gamma > 0$, and $\phi^e > 0$.

Under the pegged regimes, the resolution of exchange rate disconnect is straightforward and does not rely on the exporter-importer model feature. Suppose that the home country’s monetary authority implements a perfect currency board, implying that $e_t = \bar{e}$ for any $t$. Then the financiers’ risk-bearing capacity $\Gamma = 0$ and there are no deviations from the UIP condition, so $i_t - i_t^* - \bar{e} = 0$. Consequently, real variables are not affected by exchange-rate volatility, which is absent because $e_t = \bar{e}$ for any $t$, but only by productivity shocks.\(^{31}\)

Under the floating regimes, the resolution of exchange rate disconnect is more complex and crucially relies on exporter-importers. Suppose that the home country’s monetary authority implements a fully floating regime such that $\omega_e = 0$. Then the financiers’ risk-bearing capacity $\Gamma > 0$, implying endogenous UIP deviations and a decreasing capacity to bear the risk of an increasing volatility of $e_t$ because $\Gamma = \xi [\text{var}_t(e_t+1)]^\alpha$. Now, suppose that $\phi^e > 0$, the exporters are intensive importers, and their production technology is very different from domestic firms’, as they largely take advantage of imported inputs. The exporter-importers then are playing an active role in isolating the exchange-rate volatility in the home economy, \textit{independently} of the openness-to-international-trade parameter $\gamma$. This can be seen in Equation (3), in which real variables are increasingly muted to the volatility of $e_t$ for $\phi^e > 0$ and become completely isolated in the limit as $\phi^e \to 1$.\(^{32}\)

If output is produced by a unique firm that sells in the domestic and foreign markets, as in Itskhoki and Mukhin (2021, 2022), the firm has no incentive to specialize its production to serve one of the two markets, in particular the foreign one. So the firm cannot hedge an eventual exchange-rate shock: either it is transmitted to the final consumer through a different price, or it is absorbed through the firm’s markup. However, if output is produced by two types of firms, one selling in the domestic market and the other selling in the foreign market, the latter firm—the exporter—has an incentive to specialize its production to serve the foreign market and import a large part of its inputs from the foreign country. This results in an exporter-importer that can hedge the eventual exchange-rate shock, independently of its magnitude, without transmitting it to the rest of the economy.

3.3 Calibration

For a transparent comparison between my model with exporter-importers and a model with no exporter-importers, I follow the calibration and assumptions in Itskhoki and Mukhin (2021). I adopt the same model parameters, as summarized in Table 9 in Appendix A.3, with three exceptions: first, I change the openness-to-international-trade parameter $\gamma$ from 0.07 (the US calibration in Itskhoki and Mukhin 2021) to 0.25 to be consistent with the average imports-to-GDP ratio of Belgium over the 1960–2019 period; second, I modify the capital-adjustment-cost parameter $\theta$.
κ to match the relative volatility of investment and output, \( \frac{\text{std}(\Delta z_t)}{\text{std}(\Delta y_t)} \), whose value is 2.5 as in Itskhoiki and Mukhin (2021); third, I choose 0.23 as the value of \( \omega_e \), the weight of nominal–exchange-rate targeting (in the pegged regime) in the Taylor rule of the home country, following Itskhoiki and Mukhin (2022), as Itskhoiki and Mukhin (2021) do not analyze the pegged regimes; finally, I set \( \phi^e = 0.74 \) following the empirical finding in Amiti, Itskhoiki, and Konings (2014) that 74% is the ratio between imported inputs and exports for import-intensive exporters.33

My model, like the multi-shock version of Itskhoiki and Mukhin’s (2021) model, features three exogenous shocks for which I need to calibrate the covariance matrix: two country-specific productivity shocks \((a_t, a^*_t)\) and a financial shock \((\psi_t)\). I assume that \( \psi_t \) is orthogonal to \((a_t, a^*_t)\), whereas \( a_t \) and \( a^*_t \) have the same variance (that is, \( \sigma_a = \sigma_{a^*} \)), and a nonzero correlation \( \rho_{a,a^*} \). I always choose the relative volatility of the shocks, \( \sigma_a / \sigma_\psi \), to match the Backus-Smith correlation between the United States and the rest of the world, \( \text{corr}(\Delta q_t, \Delta c_t - \Delta c^*_t) = -0.4 \), while I always set the cross-country correlation of productivity shocks, \( \rho_{a,a^*} \), to match the correlation of the United States with the rest of the world, \( \text{corr}(\Delta y_t, \Delta y^*_t) = 0.35 \).

### 3.3.1 Calibration Results

**Floating regime.** I find four main results. First, the real exchange rate is strongly correlated with the nominal exchange rate in both models. Second, for values of \( \gamma \geq 0.25 \), there is no longer disconnect between exchange rates and other real macro variables in the theoretical model of Itskhoiki and Mukhin (2021), whereas my model maintains the disconnect thanks to the exporter-importers that actively hedge the exchange-rate shocks. Third, price and wage stickiness à la Calvo (1983) does not increase the quantitative fit of my model. Finally, I show that the theoretical model of Itskhoiki and Mukhin (2021) also misses an important feature for the United States: it is unable to capture the muted reaction of exports or imports to exchange-rate movements when they are treated separately, while I show that my model can capture this.

Table 4 reports the simulation results, for 10,000 simulations of 120 quarters, and compares the quantitative results of my model under the floating regimes (that is, \( \omega_e = 0 \)) with the quantitative results of the authors’ preferred version of the Itskhoiki and Mukhin (2021) model, the one with price and wage stickiness à la Calvo (1983). I choose values for \( \kappa, \sigma_a, \text{and } \rho_{a,a^*} \) to match \( \frac{\text{std}(\Delta z_t)}{\text{std}(\Delta y_t)} = 2.5 \), \( \text{corr}(\Delta q_t, \Delta c_t - \Delta c^*_t) = -0.4 \), and \( \text{corr}(\Delta y_t, \Delta y^*_t) = 0.35 \), respectively. In the first part of Table 4, I set the three values to target the moments in the Itskhoiki and Mukhin (2021) model with \( \gamma = 0.07 \); in the second part, I set the values to target the moments in that model with \( \gamma = 0.25 \); in the third part, I set them to target the moments in my model (with exporter-importers), which does not feature price and wage stickiness, with \( \gamma = 0.25 \). Additionally, I propose a version of my model—in the fifth column of

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33Remarkably, this represents, at most, a conservative value of \( \phi^e \), as Amiti, Itskhoiki, and Konings (2014) use Belgian firm-product-level data on exports and imports between 2000 and 2008, during which Belgium features a pegged regime under my characterization of exchange-rate regimes. Indeed, if one excludes from the calculation exports and imports to and from the euro area, the ratio between imported inputs and exports for the import-intensive exporters becomes 1.44. However, I set \( \phi^e = 0.74 \) in my calibration, as Belgium was still pegged to some countries (for example, Germany, Austria, the Netherlands) under the floating regimes.
Table 4—that features price and wage stickiness à la Calvo (1983) with the same stickiness parameters of the model in Itskhoki and Mukhin (2021). I do this to make the two models more comparable and to emphasize the pivotal role of exporter-importers.

The first result in Table 4 is that both models match the real exchange rate’s strong correlation with the nominal exchange rates in all three calibrations. However, while for $\gamma = 0.07$ the Itskhoki and Mukhin (2021) theoretical model can capture the disconnect between the volatility of exchange rates and the other real macro variables, it loses this capability when $\gamma$ is greater than or equal to 0.25. For any of the three calibrations, my model performs better than the other in insulating the real macro variables from exchange-rate volatility. This is because of the role of the exporter-importers, which actively hedge the exchange-rate shocks, independently of the shocks’ magnitude, thanks to their amount of directly imported inputs. When moments are targeted under $\gamma = 0.25$, my model requires a much lower value for $\sigma_a$ (namely, $\sigma_a = 2.9$; see lower part of Table 4) than the Itskhoki and Mukhin (2021) model (namely, $\sigma_a = 5$; see middle part of Table 4). The Itskhoki and Mukhin (2021) model, with no exporter-importers, can match a $\text{corr}(\Delta q_t, \Delta c_t - \Delta c^*_t)$ of -0.4 only by means of high volatility in exogenous productivity shocks. However, the fifth and sixth columns of Table 4 show that my model performs better without price and wage stickiness à la Calvo (1983), which represents another key difference from the Itskhoki and Mukhin (2021) model, the authors’ preferred version of which assumes price and wage stickiness à la Calvo (1983). This is not surprising given that price stability in my model endogenously arises as a result of the capacity of exporter-importers to be shock absorbers, thanks to their direct importation and local-currency pricing.34

Last, Table 5 reports the simulation results, for 10,000 simulations of 120 quarters, and compares the quantitative results of my model under the floating regimes with the quantitative results of the authors’ preferred version of the Itskhoki and Mukhin (2021) model taking into account exports and imports separately for the United States. I again set $\kappa$, $\sigma_a$, and $\rho_{a,a^*}$ to target the moments in the Itskhoki and Mukhin (2021) model with $\gamma = 0.07$. If net exports are decomposed in exports and imports, the openness-to-international-trade parameter $\gamma$ cannot play a role anymore in the model in isolating the exchange-rate volatility; see Equations (3) and (4). Indeed, if one takes them separately, their volatility in the Itskhoki and Mukhin (2021) model has the same order of magnitude of the real exchange rate (see the second and third cells in the third column), a result that is at odds with the empirical evidence (see the second and third cells in the second column). However, introducing exporter-importers into the model also solves this issue, even without modifying the calibration, because it creates a natural hedging mechanism through the imported inputs in the marginal-cost channel and local currency pricing of the exporter-importers, making real exports (imports) insulated to exchange-rate movements.

34My conjecture is that this latter result would drastically change in the presence of additional exogenous shocks. Indeed, a standard result in the literature on dynamic stochastic general equilibrium is that price and wage stickiness can improve the quantitative fit when preference, monetary, or investment-specific shocks are also incorporated in models (see, for instance, Smets and Wouters, 2003, 2007 and Justiniano, Primiceri, and Tambalotti, 2010). Finally, for a complete comparison between the two models, I also allow the two countries to be asymmetric in the same fashion as Itskhoki and Mukhin (2021, 2022). The main results do not change, and Table 10 summarizes them in the Appendix.
Overall, there are two key takeaways from these calibration results under the floating regime: (i) the Itskhoki and Mukhin (2021) model, a model without exporter-importers, cannot replicate the exchange rate disconnect for a value of the openness-to-international-trade parameter \( \gamma \geq 0.25 \), and it cannot capture the volatility of exports and imports taken into account separately for a value of the openness-to-international-trade parameter \( \gamma = 0.07 \); (ii) the same model can be modified by introducing the key feature of exporter-importers, which fixes both issues.

**Pegged regime.** Table 6 shows that my model can also accommodate a pegged regime for a value of \( \omega_e = 0.23 \), without recalibrating the covariance matrix of exogenous shocks. This results in decreased output and consumption volatilities relative to the exchange-rate volatility, but the correlation between the nominal and the real exchange rate is still strong, confirming my model’s ability to replicate the Mussa puzzle.

However, it looks like the model quantitatively underperforms, in the pegged regime, in replicating the same moments as before.\(^{35}\) This is because the real macro variables’ volatility is too low, which can be easily understood in light of my discussion in Section 3.2. Under pegged regimes, countries feature only two exogenous shocks—the country-specific productivity shocks \( (a_t, a_t^* ) \)—as the financial shock, \( \psi_t \), is completely absorbed by the financiers, which have full risk-bearing capacity (that is, \( \Gamma = 0 \)) under the pegged regimes. I can easily improve on this by adding a third type of shock—a preference shock—to the model, as in Itskhoki and Mukhin (2022), and recalibrating the covariance matrix of exogenous shocks under the floating regime. Nevertheless, as my goal is to explain exchange rate disconnect and the Mussa puzzle, with exporter-importers playing a key role in preventing transmission of exchange-rate volatility to the rest of the economy under the floating regime, I do not include preference shocks, as it keeps my model as simple as possible and fully comparable with Itskhoki and Mukhin’s (2021) model.

\(^{35}\)This can be seen by looking at \( \sigma(\Delta n x_1 )/\sigma(\Delta q ). \)
Table 4: Main Quantitative Results without and with Exporter-Importers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Floating Regime ((\omega_e = 0))</th>
<th>No Exporter-Importers ((\phi^e = 0))</th>
<th>Exporter-Importers ((\phi^e = 0.74))</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>US Moments</td>
<td>United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>corr((\Delta e_t, \Delta q_t))</td>
<td>0.99</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(\sigma(\Delta e_t)/\sigma(\Delta y_t))</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>3.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(\sigma(\Delta e_t)/\sigma(\Delta c_t))</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>5.77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(\sigma(\Delta n_x t)/\sigma(\Delta q_t))</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>0.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>corr((\Delta e_t, \Delta q_t))</td>
<td>0.99</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(\sigma(\Delta e_t)/\sigma(\Delta y_t))</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>1.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(\sigma(\Delta e_t)/\sigma(\Delta c_t))</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>3.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(\sigma(\Delta n_x t)/\sigma(\Delta q_t))</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>0.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>corr((\Delta e_t, \Delta q_t))</td>
<td>0.99</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(\sigma(\Delta e_t)/\sigma(\Delta y_t))</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>3.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(\sigma(\Delta e_t)/\sigma(\Delta c_t))</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>5.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(\sigma(\Delta n_x t)/\sigma(\Delta q_t))</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>0.17</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Price and Wage Stickiness | YES | YES | YES | NO | YES |

Notes: The US moments in the second column are from Tables 3 and 4 in Itskhoki and Mukhin (2021); the Belgian moments in the seventh column are from Section 2. Each cell in the third, fourth, fifth, and sixth columns of the table is the median value of moments across 10,000 simulations of 120 quarters; I choose \(\kappa, \sigma_a, \text{and } \rho_{a,a^*}\) to respectively match the targeted moments \(\text{std}(\Delta z_t)/\text{std}(\Delta y_t) = 2.5, \text{corr}(\Delta q_t, \Delta c_t - \Delta c_t^*) = -0.4, \text{and } \text{corr}(\Delta y_t, \Delta y_t^*) = 0.35\). In the calibration in the upper part of the table, I set \(\kappa = 6.8, \sigma_a = 2.5, \text{and } \rho_{a,a^*} = 0.37\) to match the targeted moments in the model of Itskhoki and Mukhin (2021) with \(\gamma = 0.07\). In the calibration in the middle part, I set \(\kappa = 5, \sigma_a = 5, \text{and } \rho_{a,a^*} = 0.45\) to match the targeted moments in the model of Itskhoki and Mukhin (2021) with \(\gamma = 0.25\). In the calibration in the lower part, I set \(\kappa = 9, \sigma_a = 2.9, \text{and } \rho_{a,a^*} = 0.45\) to match the targeted moments in my model with exporter-importers with \(\gamma = 0.25\) and no price and wage stickiness; the last row of the table indicates whether the model is calibrated when taking price and wage stickiness à la Calvo (1983) into account.
Table 5: Net-Exports Decomposition without and with Exporter-Importers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Floating Regime (ωe = 0)</th>
<th>US Moments</th>
<th>No Exporter-Importers (ϕe = 0)</th>
<th>Exporter-Importers (ϕe = 0.74)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>γ</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>σ(Δe_t)/σ(Δy_t)</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>3.38</td>
<td>3.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>σ(Δq_t)/σ(Δexports_t)</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>0.93</td>
<td>2.99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>σ(Δq_t)/σ(Δimports_t)</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>0.94</td>
<td>3.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>σ(Δnx_t)/σ(Δq_t)</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>0.09</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Price and Wage Stickiness: YES

Notes: The first and the fourth US moments in the second column are respectively from Tables 3 and 4 in Itskhoki and Mukhin (2021); the second and the third US moments in the second column are from Section 2. exports_t = y_t without exporter-importers and exports_t = y_t + e_t with exporter-importers. imports_t = y_t without exporter-importers and imports_t = y_t + e_t with exporter-importers. Each cell in the third and fourth columns of the table is the median value of moments across 10,000 simulations of 120 quarters; I choose κ, σ_a, and ρ_{a,a*} to respectively match the targeted moments std(Δz_t)/std(Δy_t) = 2.5, corr(Δq_t, Δc_t − Δc_t*) = −0.4, and corr(Δy_t, Δy_t*) = 0.35: I set κ = 6.8, σ_a = 2.5, and ρ_{a,a*} = 0.37 to match the targeted moments in the model of Itskhoki and Mukhin (2021) with γ = 0.07. The last row of the table indicates whether the model is calibrated when taking price and wage stickiness à la Calvo (1983) into account.
Table 6: Quantitative Results for Belgium across Exchange-Rate Regimes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pegged Regime</th>
<th>$\omega_e = 0.23$</th>
<th>Belgian Moments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$corr(\Delta e_t, \Delta q_t)$</td>
<td>0.99</td>
<td>0.61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\sigma(\Delta e_t)/\sigma(\Delta y_t)$</td>
<td>1.73</td>
<td>1.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\sigma(\Delta e_t)/\sigma(\Delta c_t)$</td>
<td>2.96</td>
<td>1.39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\sigma(\Delta nx_t)/\sigma(\Delta q_t)$</td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td>0.88</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Floating Regime</th>
<th>$\omega_e = 0$</th>
<th>Belgian Moments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$corr(\Delta e_t, \Delta q_t)$</td>
<td>0.98</td>
<td>0.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\sigma(\Delta e_t)/\sigma(\Delta y_t)$</td>
<td>2.32</td>
<td>3.74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\sigma(\Delta e_t)/\sigma(\Delta c_t)$</td>
<td>4.85</td>
<td>4.79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\sigma(\Delta nx_t)/\sigma(\Delta q_t)$</td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td>0.17</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: The Belgian moments in the third column are from Section 2. Each cell in the second column is the median value of moments across 10,000 simulations of 120 quarters; I choose $\kappa = 9$, $\sigma_a = 2.9$, and $\rho_{q,a} = 0.45$ to respectively match the targeted moments $std(\Delta c_t)/std(\Delta y_t) = 2.5$, $corr(\Delta q_t, \Delta c_t - \Delta c^*_t) = -0.4$, and $corr(\Delta y_t, \Delta y^*_t) = 0.35$ under the floating regime; I set $\omega_e = 0.23$, as in Itskhoki and Mukhin (2022), under the pegged regime.
4 Conclusion

How should researchers think about exchange-rate regimes? In this paper, consistently with the previous literature on the Mussa puzzle and exchange rate disconnect, I show that such regimes affect the volatilities of nominal and real exchange rates but not the volatilities of other real macro variables, even for economies that have larger exports and imports, compared to total output, than the United States. I also provide a set of assumptions under which modeling this muted reaction is possible, and I show how this result crucially relies on exporters also being firms that intensively import. In the future, I plan to investigate three further questions.

First, using the results from a simple generalized autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity model on the nominal– and real–exchange-rate series, we can empirically observe that during episodes of very high inflation and hyperinflation, the real exchange rate comoves less and less with the nominal exchange rate, resulting in a weakening of the Mussa puzzle. In such cases, exchange-rate regimes interact with inflationary regimes, an empirical result that is at odds with the price stability that ultimately generates the Mussa puzzle. However, this can be modeled in light of menu-cost pricing à la Mankiw (1985): if exogenous shocks affect nominal exchange rates when firms are already changing their prices because of the inflationary regime, such shocks can be incorporated in the new prices at no additional cost.

Second, is the import intensity of the exporters a structural parameter of the economy—as I assume in my model—or is it endogenous to the exchange-rate regime? In other words, does $\phi^e$ adjust at the time of an exchange-rate regime break that modifies the volatility of the nominal exchange rate? The question has to be systematically investigated at the micro level by asking: how do firms adjust their production function immediately before and after an exchange-rate regime break that changes the volatility of the nominal exchange rate? The model developed here could be easily extended to account for this additional feature of firm optimization.

Third, I emphasize that the exogenous shock in the exchange-rate regime appears in the theoretical model, and its calibration, as a different value of parameter $\omega_e$. This is not necessarily true in the case of a regime break that endogenously arises in response to conditions that are exogenous to the two economies.

References


Appendix for “Exchange-Rate Regimes and Exporters-Importers”

(PRELIMINARY AND INCOMPLETE)
### Table 7: Available Time Periods for the Macro Variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Exchange Rates</th>
<th>Real Macro Variables</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>1/1957-12/2019</td>
<td>1/1960-12/2019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>1/1957-12/2019</td>
<td>1/1960-12/2019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>1/1957-12/2019</td>
<td>1/1960-12/2019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>1/1980-12/2019</td>
<td>1/1996-12/2019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>1/1957-12/2019</td>
<td>1/1961-12/2019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>1/1957-12/2019</td>
<td>1/1960-12/2019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finlanda</td>
<td>1/1957-12/2019</td>
<td>1/1960-12/2019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>1/1957-12/2019</td>
<td>1/1960-12/2019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Exchange Rates</td>
<td>Real Macro Variables</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>-------------------</td>
<td>----------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>1/1957-12/2019</td>
<td>1/1960-12/2019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>1/1957-12/2019</td>
<td>1/1960-12/2019</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>1/1957-12/2019</td>
<td>1/1960-12/2019</td>
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<td>Italy</td>
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<td>Japan</td>
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<td>Luxembourg</td>
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<td>Netherlands</td>
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<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>1/1957-12/2019</td>
<td>1/1960-12/2019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Exchange Rates</td>
<td>Real Macro Variables</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------</td>
<td>--------------------</td>
<td>----------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
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<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
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<td>Spain&lt;sup&gt;bc&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>1/1957-12/2019</td>
<td>1/1960-12/2019</td>
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<td>Sweden</td>
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<td>1/1957-12/2019</td>
<td>1/1957-12/2019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>1/1957-12/2019</td>
<td>1/1957-12/2019</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes:<sup>a</sup> Given that the Lavielle (1999) and Lavielle and Moulines (2000) test is particularly sensitive to observations in the series that significantly depart from the rest, I run it only over the period from January 1963 to December 2019.<sup>b</sup>Given that the Lavielle (1999) and Lavielle and Moulines (2000) test is particularly sensitive to observations in the series that significantly depart from the rest, I run it only over the period from January 1960 to December 2019.<sup>c</sup>The bilateral nominal exchange rate in March 1964 is missing; I construct it by linear interpolation.